During the 2016 presidential election, the American people encountered an unprecedented amount of Russian-planted misinformation on social media platforms. Taiwan had a similar experience due to Chinese intervention in its 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024 elections. Misinformation undermines a healthy public discourse, which is the foundation of a democratic society. Democracies have been made aware of the imminent risks from misinformation and have sought to find ways of keeping it under control. Two dominant approaches have been used: self-governance by internet platforms and government regulation. Taiwan, by contrast, is pursuing a nuanced third alternative based on its civil society.

Encouraging internet service providers (ISPs), such as Facebook, Twitter, or Google, to regulate harmful content by themselves is the US approach. In the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Section 230, the US Congress gave ISPs immunity from liability for harms caused by third-party-generated content. The problem is that ISPs profit by attracting audience attention. Section 230 left them without incentive or pressure to effectively tackle the problem of misinformation.

The second popular approach relies on government regulation. In democracies that value free speech, regulation may be justified by pointing to the harm to the public sphere caused by false information flooding social media. To protect democracy, the government must effectively control the Internet. Yet such regulation may undermine democracy itself. Authoritarian governments prefer this approach. For example, in 2016, China enacted its Cybersecurity Law to regulate online platforms directly, generating much criticism and fear.

Taiwan’s experience offers a third possibility, one that has emerged organically from its political democratization process. In essence, the government allows civil society to take the lead and then supports its efforts to identify and correct online misinformation.

In essence, the government allows civil society to take the lead and supports its efforts to identify and correct online misinformation.

The late 1980s saw the beginnings of a more open society in Taiwan. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) flourished, particularly public-interest advocacy groups. A renowned legal scholar, Yeh Jiunn-rong, has applied the term “civic constitutionalism” to the civic-centric, reform-minded movements that emerged and have driven constitutional change in Taiwan ever since. We argue that Taiwan society’s response to the challenge from internet misinformation offers an example of civic constitutionalism in action.

Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Movement was a monumental test of civic constitutionalism. It began on March 18, 2014, when students occupied the Legislative Yuan for weeks to protest the passage of a Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which the students feared would increase China’s influence over Taiwan. Key features of civic constitutionalism were observed in the Sunflower Movement. First, civic society expressed its disagreement with the legislature and took action to oppose the CSSTA. The general public was empowered and educated to better understand the issues at stake. Scholars played an important role by spreading knowledge and encouraging public discussions. At about the same time, the Constitutional Court issued a landmark decision, J. Y. Interpretation No 718, which granted exceptions from prior permit requirements for urgent assemblies and demonstrations.

The features observed in the Sunflower Movement can be seen in Taiwan’s current fight against online misinformation. During Taiwan’s 2018 local elections, NGOs were quick to notice that misinformation was a severe issue. Two NGOs, the Taiwan Media Watch Foundation and the Association for Quality Journalism, established the Taiwan FactCheck Center (台灣事實查核中心) on July 31, 2018 to receive complaints of fake information. Upon receiving complaints, the Center would investigate and release their findings to the public. Other citizens and NGOs also established online fact-check services, such as MyGoPen, Cofacts, Rumor & Truth, and Auntie Meiyu. Still other NGOs worked to educate the general public about the nature of misinformation, a real threat to Taiwan’s democracy. For example, Doublethink Lab focused on revealing China’s misinformation attacks.

An incident that took place later that year played a critical role in triggering social support for the fight against misinformation. On September 4, 2018, a typhoon caused serious damage to Kansai International Airport in Japan, stranding thousands of travelers from various countries. In a post on the PTT Bulletin Board System, a very popular platform in Taiwan, someone claiming to be a Taiwanese citizen said the Chinese government had provided him with transportation that day from the airport to a hotel. The author praised China’s government and accused the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECO) in Japan of inaction. Faced with mounting pressure and public blame, an official of TECO in Japan committed suicide. But an investigation later found that the PTT post had been forwarded from a website in China and was false, as Japan’s government did not allow any countries to pick up travelers from the airport that day. It was a case of fake news.

Taiwan had no laws at the time to effectively fight against misinformation. In response to public anger and fear about the risk posed by fake news, the government began working to enact policies and modify laws to fight against misinformation. On October 10, 2018, President Tsai Ing-wen emphasized the importance of combating fake news in her National Day speech. On December 13, 2018, the Executive Yuan released a “Report on Preventing the Hazards of Fake News” that presented four strategies to mitigate against misinformation: enhancing citizens’ media literacy and judgment, creating mechanisms for clarification and third-party fact-checking, collaborating with media platforms, and holding individuals accountable for fake news through fair and independent judicial review. However, ISPs pushed back. They issued an open letter through the Asia Internet Coalition arguing that the government’s proposals would undermine freedom of speech. The government responded to the ISPs’ letter by urging them to take responsibility for self-governance.

In June 2022, Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC) proposed the Digital Intermediary Services Act (DISA), taking inspiration from the Digital Services Act of the European Union. Among other things, the DISA would have empowered government agencies to apply to a court for “information restriction orders” and “emergency information restriction orders” to compel ISPs to remove or otherwise restrict illegal content. Even though civil society had long expressed serious concerns with harmful online content, the NCC’s proposed law drew strong opposition from various NGOs, which said it excessively infringed on freedom of expression. This time, NGOs joined with the ISPs and led to the NCC withdrawing the DISA draft. On June 21, 2019, to demonstrate their determination to fight against fake news on their own initiative, five ISPs announced a Code of Practice for Self-Discipline for Preventing Misinformation.

Theses interactions among civic society, the internet industry, and the government demonstrate the four key features of civic constitutionalism:

Civil society had a different interpretation of freedom of speech than the government. The government hesitated to impose regulations. NGOs and citizens then took the initiative.
NGOs and citizens created various tools to identify false information and enhanced the general public’s media literacy.
The efforts by civil society strengthened government transparency, which had long been neglected, by forcing the government to provide more detailed and specific information about its policies. NGOs and citizen used fact-checking mechanisms to verify government information.
When the government proposed the DISA draft, civil society was aware of the potential risk to freedom of speech and took the initiative to protect online autonomy.

In general, the government supplemented and strengthened citizens’ actions to confront fake news instead of trying to replace them.

To date, Taiwan still lacks a comprehensive government legal framework to deal with online misinformation. But civil society has been able to address misinformation through voluntary actions. These actions also protected the January 13, 2024 presidential election from fake news attacks. In general, the government supplemented and strengthened citizens’ actions to confront fake news instead of trying to replace them.

Taiwan’s experience in fighting against misinformation is an embodiment of civic constitutionalism. It helps us to go beyond “democracy vs. authoritarianism,” “efficiency vs. inefficiency,” and “state vs. market” to seek solutions to misinformation. Solutions emerge from interactions among three key players: the state, market and citizens. Cooperating with empowered citizens, instead of either entirely trusting or restraining industry, can be an option to fight against misinformation.

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Wen-Chen Chang is Distinguished Professor of National Taiwan University College of Law and a joint-appointment professor at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University School of Law.

Yu-teng Lin is a partner at Oz & Goodwin Global Law Firm in Taiwan, a recent visiting scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute of NYU School of Law, and an executive director of the Judicial Reform Foundation.

Suggested Citation:
Wen-Chen Chang and Yu-teng Lin, “A Civil Society-Based Approach to Online Misinformation: The Experience of Taiwan,” USALI Perspectives, 4, No. 7, February 19, 2024, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/a-civil-society-based-approach-to-online-misinformation.

The views expressed in USALI Perspectives are those of the authors, and do not represent those of USALI or NYU.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.